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INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: WHY THE 
“AMERICAN LAWS FOR AMERICAN COURTS” MOVEMENT 
IS A VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 





In recent years, the “American Laws for American Courts” movement 
has swept across the country in an attempt to ban international law 
from U.S. state courts. This article specifically examines the Oklahoma 
Save Our State Amendment and the Arizona Foreign Decisions Act. In 
doing so, it addresses both the constitutional and policy problems with 
these attempts, observing that what the states have been trying to do is 
neither legal nor practical. It analyzes the inability of individual states 
to unilaterally avoid compliance with the United States’ international 
law obligations. It notes the absurdity in outlawing international law in 
order to uphold “American” rights when the well-known goals of 
international law itself are to protect the rights of all people. Finally, 
this article provides less extreme alternatives to an outright ban of all 
international law that will nonetheless support the well-intentioned 
aspects of the movement. 
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Over a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States 
determined that international law is part of United States law.1  Support 
for this concept originates in the U.S. Constitution.2  Recently, 
however, there has been a movement across the United States that 
seeks to prohibit state judges from referring to international law when 
deciding cases.3 Although the stated objectives of the various proposed 
legislative prohibitions and constitutional amendments may seem 
plausible, banning the application of international law in state courts 
would be an extremely unfortunate mistake. States do not have the 
power to unilaterally abrogate the United States’ international treaty 
obligations, and even if they did, the goal of promoting individual 
rights and human equality is one shared by international law and the 
American legal tradition.4  
 
This comment addresses the constitutionality and 
effectiveness of the trend towards banning international law, and 
specifically international treaties, from state courts.  Part I provides an 
overview of the “American Laws for American Courts” movement, and 
introduces two manifestations of this movement: the Oklahoma Save 
Our State Amendment and the Arizona Foreign Decisions Act.5  Part II 
is divided into four primary subsections.  Part II.A examines the states’ 
purpose in passing legislation that prohibits their judges from looking 
at certain types of non-American laws, such as Sharia law, foreign laws 
generally, and in particular, international law.6  Part II.B analyzes the 
legality of these state actions in the contexts of both compliance with 
the United States Constitution and the United States’ obligations under 
                                                     
1 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating, “international 
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination”); 
see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).  
2 See infra Part II.B.1.  
3 Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, State Legislators Target Foreign Law, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702046622045771
99372686077412.html?mg=reno64-wsj.   
4 See infra Part II.B. 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra Part II.A. 
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international law as a nation.7  Part II.C notes the incongruity between 
the stated goals of the “American Laws for American Courts” 
movement and its effects.8  Finally, Part II.D provides alternatives that 
will protect rights without violating the Constitution or international 
law.9  
 
 THE “AMERICAN LAWS FOR AMERICAN COURTS” II.
MOVEMENT  
 
Over the last few years, several states have attempted to 
prohibit their judges from looking at, being influenced by, or applying 
any law other than state law.10  This includes foreign, religious, and 
international law.11  Two prominent examples of these attempts include 
the Oklahoma Save our State Amendment12 and the Arizona Foreign 
Decisions Act,13 although similar actions have been instituted in twenty 
other states as part of a nationwide trend known as the “American Laws 
for American Courts” movement.14 
 
Oklahoma's attempt to amend its state constitution with the 
addition of the so-called Save Our State Amendment began in 2010 
with a referendum to put the proposed amendment on the ballot.15  The 
ballot text informed voters that the amendment would change the 
Oklahoma state constitution and, specifically, that the addition “makes 
courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases.  It forbids 
courts from considering or using international law.  It forbids courts 
from considering or using Sharia Law.”16  Even when judges are faced 
with cases of first impression, they may not be influenced by any of 
                                                     
7 See infra Part II.B.  
8 See infra Part II.C.  
9 See infra Part II.D.  
10 Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 3.   
11 Id. 
12 See H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save Our 
State Amendment).  
13 See H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (“Arizona 
Foreign Decisions Act”).   
14 Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 3.  
15 Ken Chan, Save Our State from Ourselves: The Oklahoma Anti-
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these “foreign” laws.17  The ballot further explained that international 
law, or the law of nations, “is formed by the general assent of civilized 
nations,” and its sources include “international agreements, as well as 
treaties.”18  Despite efforts by its proponents, the Save Our State 
Amendment has not been added to the Oklahoma state constitution.19  
Although the proposal won over the public vote,20 the judiciary shortly 
thereafter found the amendment unconstitutional.21  
 
In January 2012, the Tenth Circuit ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Save Our State Amendment.22  Muneer Awad, 
Executive Director of the Council on American Islamic Relations-
Oklahoma, brought the suit in November 2010, complaining that the 
amendment violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
because of its ban of Sharia law.23  The Tenth Circuit, applying strict 
scrutiny,24 determined that the state’s interest was not sufficiently 
                                                     
17 See Eugene Volokh, Oklahoma House of Representatives Proposes 
Ban on Use of Foreign Law in Oklahoma Courts, THE VOLOKH 




18 Chan, supra note 15. 
19 John Crook, Tenth Circuit Upholds Injunction Barring Oklahoma 
Anti-Sharia, Anti-international Law Constitutional Amendment, 106 
AM.J.INT’L.L. 365, 365-66 (2012). 
20 The proposed amendment garnered approximately 70% of the votes 
by the people of Oklahoma, enough to be officially adopted. Id.  
21 See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
22 See Id. 
23 Id. at 1118-19. The Establishment and Free Exercises Clauses are part 
of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and require that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
24 Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129.  Strict scrutiny is the level of review used 
for challenges to the constitutionality of legislation when there is a 
suspect distinction or fundamental right at issue, such as the suspect 
discrimination among religions in Awad.  Id.; see also Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1558 (9th ed. abr. 2010).  To overcome a strict scrutiny 
challenge and have its legislation upheld as valid, “the state must 
establish that it has a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates 
the law in question.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1224 (9th ed. abr. 2010).  
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compelling to overcome interference with Awad’s religious freedoms.25  
Specifically, the state had not proven that there was an actual problem 
that the amendment was intended to solve.26  There was no showing of 
any previous use by a state court of Sharia, foreign, or international 
law, and more importantly, no showing that there had ever been a 
problem regarding reliance on such laws.27  As a result of the Awad 
case, the injunction to prevent certification of the amendment, granted 
by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, was 
upheld.28  The Court struck down the Oklahoma Save Our State 
Amendment solely based on its ban of the religious Sharia law, with no 
analysis as to the foreign and international law provisions.29 
 
Also in 2010, Arizona tried to pass a law known as the 
Arizona Foreign Decisions Act.30  Like the Save our State Amendment, 
the Arizona Foreign Decisions Act sought to prevent the use of law 
other than state or federal law in a “decision, finding or opinion as 
controlling or influential authority,” or as “a precedent or the 
foundation for any legal theory.”31  The prohibited laws included 
“tenet[s] of any body of religious or sectarian law” and “any case law 
or statute from another country or a foreign body or any jurisdiction 
that is outside of the United States and its territories.”32 
 
The Arizona Foreign Decisions Act, however, contained some 
distinctions from the Save our State Amendment that made it a bit more 
practical and less extreme.33  Most significantly, the Arizona state 
legislature made sure to assert that law based on the Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition was not considered “foreign” law.34  Because many legal 
                                                     
25 Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130. 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 1132.  
29 See generally id. at 1129–31. 
30 See H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (“Arizona 
Foreign Decisions Act”).  
31 See Chan, supra note 15; see Volokh, supra note 17; see Jones & 
Palazzolo, supra note 3; see also supra text corresponding notes 15 & 
17.  
32 See H.B. 2582. 
33 See H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save Our 
State Amendment); see Chan, supra note 15; see Volokh, supra note 
17.    
34 See H.B. 2582. 
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principles in the United States have developed from the English 
common law, all statutes, case law, and principles based on this 
heritage that were adopted before the Arizona Foreign Decisions Act 
remain available to judges, despite their potential classification as 
"foreign."35  Additionally, the proposed Act provided an exception to 
the ban on religious law in “recognition of a traditional marriage 
between a man and a woman as officiated by the clergy or a secular 
official.”36  The Arizona Foreign Decisions Act, like the Save our State 
Amendment, received public support by the people of Arizona, and was 
signed into law by the governor in April 2011.37  Unfortunately for 
proponents, however, the enacting legislation, although approved by 
the House Judiciary Committee, died in the House Rules Committee 
when the legislature adjourned.38  
 
These state actions are problematic in ways that open the door 
to seriously negative (and illegal) results. They are discriminatory, as 
brought to light by the Oklahoma Save Our State Amendment with its 
singling out of Sharia law.39  There is furthermore the question of 
whether there is even a need for states to introduce new legislation that 
essentially grants permission for judges to disregard potentially useful 
“foreign” laws.40  Finally, and most at issue here, is the fact that these 
state actions attempt to unilaterally ignore international law.  This last 
aspect is neither up to the state legislatures’ discretion,41 nor is it a good 
idea in an increasingly global world.42 
                                                     
35 See id. This provision is particularly pertinent when evaluating anti-
international law legislation’s validity because all state law is founded 
on the traditions of the British common law.  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 252–53 (9th ed. abr. 2010).  Because international law is 
part of British common law, it is therefore necessarily part of state law.  
36 See H.B. 2582.  
37 Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Law in 
Arizona, Bills Advance in Missouri and Texas, Failing in Most States, 





39 H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save Our State 
Amendment). 
40 See also infra Part II.D.2 for a discussion on the doctrine of comity. 
41 See infra Part II.B. 
42 See infra Part II.C. 
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 THE LEGISLATION PROPOSED BY THE AMERICAN III.
LAWS FOR AMERICAN COURTS MOVEMENT, THOUGH 
COMMENDABLE IN ITS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE 
RIGHTS, IS NOT WITHIN THE STATES’ 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GRANTED POWER 
 
 The Promotion of Rights A.
 
State enactments restricting judges from applying law other 
than state and federal law can be examined both generally and in the 
context of the specific law prohibited. Although this comment focuses 
on the prohibition of international law, it is helpful to look at the other 
provisions in these enactments for context.  Examining these provisions 
and the reasoning behind them provides a stronger understanding of 
why states want to ban international law, and furthermore, why doing 
so makes little sense. 
 
Ultimately, the states seem to want to protect the basic rights 
guaranteed to Americans by the Constitution and by the principles on 
which the United States was founded.43  Forcing judges to eschew 
Sharia law, foreign law, and international law theoretically serves this 
purpose, each in a particular way.44  However, promoting rights by 
banning international law is a dubious concept, as international law is 
particularly concerned with upholding rights.45  
 
 Sharia Law  1.
 
States favoring the American Laws for American Courts 
movement have targeted Sharia law as a type of law categorically 
opposed to the guarantee of human rights.46  Although some proposed 
state legislation merely provides for the elimination of any religious 
law or doctrine from state courts, the more extreme proposals name 
Sharia law specifically.47  The potential merit here lies in the 
                                                     
43 American Laws for American Courts, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 
ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-
for-american-courts/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
44 See infra Part II.A.1–3. 
45 See infra Part II.A.3.  
46 American Laws for American Courts, supra note 43; see H.R.J. Res. 
1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save Our State Amendment). 
47 Compare H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) 
(“Arizona Foreign Decisions Act”)(stating “a court shall not use, 
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inescapable fact that the Islamic nations using Sharia law have a 
conception of individual rights different from that generally 
acknowledged in the United States.48   
 
The opportunity to apply a law other than the local, state, or 
federal law most commonly arises in family law cases, such as for 
divorce or child custody.49  The states trying to prevent Sharia law from 
entering into their courts, therefore, can objectively be seen as 
attempting to protect the rights of women and children in a way that 
they might not be able to experience in their own country.50  Supporters 
of the American Laws for American Courts movement fear that “Sharia 
law, as an example of foreign law, may result in the violation, in the 
specific matter at issue, of a liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of 
the United States or the public policies of the state in question.”51 
 
 Foreign Law  2.
 
Foreign law is defined as “the law of another country.”52  
Therefore, it logically follows that state courts might be hesitant to put 
too much weight on foreign judgments and laws in order to preserve 
the emphasis on rights present in the United States, which may not be 
                                                                                                          
implement, refer to or incorporate a tent of any body of religious 
sectarian law”), with H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 
2010) (Save Our State Amendment)(stating that the constitutional 
amendment “forbids courts from looking at . . . from Sharia law when 
deciding cases”). 
48 See Shariah Law and American State Courts, Sharia in American 
Courts, http://shariahinamericancourts.com/?page_id=16. 
49 See id. 
50 Id.  The “Shariah Law and American State Courts” Report notes 
several categories of issues that may result in the exact sort of feared 
anti-rights court judgment to be avoided, “including conflicts in the 
area of polygamy, marriage to non-Muslims, forced marriages, and 
spousal abuse.”  Id.  There are the additional concerns that “some 
Muslims are proactively interested in ways to legitimately opt out of 
the United States legal norms that potentially conflict with their Islamic 
preferences.”  Id.  
51 Shariah Law, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY ALLIANCE, 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/issues-2/shariah-law/ (last visited Jan. 
13, 2013). 
52 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 720 (9th ed. 2009). 
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similarly emphasized in foreign legal systems and cultures.53  The 
official website for the American Laws for American Courts movement 
explains that “America has unique values of liberty which do not exist 
in foreign legal systems,” rights which include “freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, due process, right to privacy, 
[and the] right to keep and bear arms.”54  It is understandable that state 
courts would want to uphold these “unique values” and avoid having to 
follow any other influential law or judicial decision that acts contrary to 
those values.55  
 
 International Law  3.
 
Moving away from the tentative merits and the separate set of 
problems and solutions posed by the states’ ban on Sharia and foreign 
law, attempts to restrict international law must now be examined.  
Unfortunately, there is much less obvious reasoning behind the bans on 
international law than there is for the restrictions on religious and 
foreign law.  It must be assumed, therefore, that the purpose behind the 
provisions directed at international law is similar to the purposes of the 
other bans.56  
 
The provisions themselves provide little reason to think that 
outlawing international law should be any different than outlawing 
religious or foreign law.57  The Oklahoma Save Our State Amendment 
straightforwardly describes international law as “the law of nations . . . 
formed by the general assent of civilized nations [which includes] 
treaties.”58  The Arizona Foreign Decisions Act includes international 
organizations under its definition of “Foreign Body,” mentioning 
specifically, “the United Nations and any agency thereunder, the 
European Union and any agency thereunder, an international judiciary, 
the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, the World Bank and the Socialist International.”59  
These examples seem to indicate that states should be wary of 
                                                     
53 American Laws for American Courts, supra note 43. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
57 See H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save Our 
State Amendment); see H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2011) (“Arizona Foreign Decisions Act”).    
58 H.R.J. 1056. 
59 See H.B. 2582 at sec.(f). 
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international law because, like foreign law, it was developed by people 
who have a different understanding of rights than that held by the 
United States and its legal system.60  
 
Another purpose behind the ban on international law, one that 
is perhaps less openly acknowledged, is that Americans may not feel 
readily disposed to relinquish legal control of domestic issues to an 
international body.61  This agenda can be inferred from U.S. 
jurisprudence regarding treaties.62  In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme 
Court ruled on the enforceability of decisions handed down by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in state courts.63  When the 
President and the Senate accepted the provisions in the United Nations 
Charter concerning the ICJ, the Supreme Court wrote: “[I]f ICJ 
judgments were regarded as automatically enforceable domestic law, 
they would be immediately and directly binding on state and federal 
courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause [but] there is no reason to 
believe that the President and Senate signed up for such a result.”64  
Clearly, the United States, as represented by the Supreme Court 
Justices handing down the Medellin decision, felt uneasy about giving 
up its own ability to regulate what laws are enforceable in the United 
States.65 
 
This idea is reiterated when the Medellin court continued, 
“Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be 
followed before federal law can be created under the Constitution . . . 
They also recognized that treaties could create federal law, but again 
through the political branches.”66  It is therefore plausible, that like the 
federal government, the state governments wish to retain as much 
control as possible over what laws are enforceable in their domestic 
jurisdictions, and the way they see necessary to accomplish that goal is 
by banning any intrusion of international law in their state courts.  In 
fact, the American Laws for American Courts website directly 
advocates that “state legislatures have a vital role to play in preserving 
those constitutional rights and American values of liberty and freedom” 
                                                     
60 See H.B. 2582; see generally infra Part II.A.2. 
61 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510–11, 515 (2008). 
62 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 510–11, 515; see also Part II.B.2. 
63 See generally Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491. 
64 Id. at 510–11. 
65 Id. 
66 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 515. 
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that could be jeopardized if state judges are permitted to use 
international law in their determinations and judgments.67 
 
However, it also seems that the hostile attitude towards 
international law taken by some states is an extreme attitude, and one 
that is not legally correct.68  International law is not consistently 
included as a separate provision, and is more often considered a subset 
of foreign law.69  In other words, legislation developed by an 
international organization is seen as coming from a foreign legal 
system, comparable to laws coming from a foreign nation.70  This 
attitude is not accurate, as the international legal community 
differentiates foreign law as law that is local to a particular country 
from international law as the law common to all countries.71  Even the 
website dedicated toward promoting the American Laws for American 
Courts movement glosses over international law as an independent 
cause for concern, including it only briefly in its model legislation 
section as a possible type of foreign legal system.72 
 
 Legality of Individual States Banning B.
International Law 
 
International law can be broken down into four subsets: 
treaties, customary law, general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations, and judicial decisions and scholarly teachings.73  The 
legality of banning each of the four types of international law may be 
analyzed separately, but this Comment will focus solely on treaties.  
 
                                                     
67 American Laws for American Courts, supra note 43. 
68 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save 
Our State Amendment). 
69 See H.R.J. Res. 1056; see H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2011) (“Arizona Foreign Decisions Act”).  
70 Compare H.R.J. Res 1056, with H.B. 2582. 
71 International Law is defined as “the legal system governing the 
relationships between nations…embracing not only nations but also 
such participants as international organizations and individuals (such as 
those who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes).”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (9th ed. 2010).  
72 American Laws for American Courts, supra note 43.  The Arizona 
Foreign Decisions Act seems to be one of the states to have closely 
adopted the proposed model legislation. See H.R.J. Res. 1056. 
73 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para.       1.  
Journal of International Law 
115 
 
A treaty, also called convention or accord, is defined as “an 
international agreement concluded between two or more states in 
written form and governed by international law.”74  By their nature, 
treaties hold a great deal of weight as formal written contracts, and 
therefore seem to command compliance.75 
 
In the United States, international treaties between the United 
States and the global community fall under the power of the federal 
government, not the individual states.76  As the United States acts as 
one nation for the purposes of foreign interactions, it is accordingly 
better that it present one unified international presence.  There are 
numerous sources for this division of power—primarily legal 
documents—such as the U.S. Constitution and case law handed down 
from the U.S. Supreme Court.77  
 
 U.S. Constitution 4.
 
Article I, Section 10 lists some of the powers that are denied to 
the states and reserved for the federal government.78  Clause One 
declares, “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation.”79  Clause Two forbids states from laying “any Imposts 
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection Laws” or if Congress consents.80  
Finally, Clause Three prohibits states from engaging in any action 
related to war, “unless actually invaded,” the state is “in such imminent 
danger as will not admit of delay,” or Congress consents.81  These 
provisions clearly indicate that individual states may not take unilateral 
action on an international level without the consent of the federal 
government or the existence of some extraordinary countervailing 
concern.82  
 
If the Constitution forbids states from becoming actively 
involved in international matters, it should follow that the intent behind 
                                                     
74 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (9th ed. abr. 2010). 
75 See id. 
76 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
77 See infra Part II.B.1–2 
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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Article I, Section 10 also forbids states from individually dropping out 
of international matters in which the United States has involved in as a 
whole.83  A federal system, such as the one in the U.S., generally 
reserves much power to the local levels of government, however it does 
not grant them the power to override decisions made by the federal 
government.84  Article VI, Section 1, Clause Two synthesizes this 
important concept.85  The so-called “Supremacy Clause” states:  
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.86 
 
Thus, the logic follows that states may not affirmatively act as 
individuals on the international plane, they may not disregard decisions 
made by the federal government, and therefore, they may not 
unilaterally decide to disregard an international treaty to which the 
United States is a party.87  In fact, such an intention has been recognized 
in the congressional records concerning U.S. support of various 
international treaties.88  Regarding human rights treaties in particular, 
ratification normally occurs with the “understanding that state and local 
governments implement treaty obligations pertaining to matters within 
                                                     
83 See id. 
84 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating, “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”) This provision is 
relevant here because it confirms that the powers enumerated in Article 
I, Section 10 are those “prohibited by it [the Constitution] to the 
States.” U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Therefore, 
the 10th Amendment confirms that all international matters are to be 
under the regulation and initiation of the federal government, not the 
individual states. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
85 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
86 Id.  
87 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.   
88 See Risa E. Kaufman, “By Some Other Means”: Considering the 
Executive’s Role in Fostering Subnational Human Rights Compliance, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1971, 1974 (2012). 
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their jurisdiction,” despite the power limitations the Constitution 
commands.89  
 
 Non-self-executing Treaties and Medellin 5.
 
In Supreme Court decisions discussing the United States’ 
obligation under international law, the central issue often concerns the 
difference of function between self-executing treaties and non-self-
executing treaties.90  The United States tends to consider international 
treaties to be non-self-executing, meaning that there must be some 
enacting legislation proffered by Congress before the treaty can be 
binding on the states as domestic law under the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution.91  However, it is acknowledged that a treaty to which 
the United States is a party nevertheless “creates an international law 
obligation on the part of the United States, [although] it does not of its 
own force constitute binding federal law.”92  
 
The recent and much discussed Medellin case elaborates on 
not only on the difference between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties, but also on the role of the federal and state 
governments regarding the international obligations formed by 
treaties.93  When there is no enacting congressional legislation for a 
treaty, it is not part of United States law and cannot be enforced as 
                                                     
89 Id.; see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 (stating that a treaty ordinarily 
“depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the 
honor of the government which are parties to it.”).  
90 See, e.g. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491. 
91 Kaufman, supra note 88, at 1974.  To determine whether a treaty is 
self-executing or non-self-executing, interpretation must begin with the 
text of the treaty itself.  Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506.  The language of the 
treaty, and additionally evidence of signatory intent based on the 
negotiations and previous drafts, will indicate whether the signatories 
clearly intended the treaty to automatically become domestic law, or 
whether some other step was to be made prior to domestic execution.  
Id. at 505, 507. 
92 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 522–23.  In other words, even when Congress 
has not created legislation specifically making a treaty binding as the 
supreme law of the land under Article VI, Section 1, Clause 2, the 
United States is still obligated to honor its commitment under 
international law, notwithstanding how domestically enforceable the 
treaty currently stands.  Id. 
93 See generally Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491.  
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such, despite the commitment the United States has made under 
international law.94  The Medellin court, citing to Alexander Hamilton’s 
Federalist No. 33, distinguishes between actual federal laws and 
treaties, “comparing laws that individuals are ‘bound to observe’ as ‘the 
supreme law of the land’ with ‘a mere treaty, dependent on the good 
faith of the parties.’”95  If there has been no implementing legislation, a 
treaty may be assumed to be merely a “good faith” obligation, rather 
than a binding commitment enforceable in all United States courts.96  
 
The Medellin case dealt with the aftermath of the ICJ case, 
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12, which found the United States in violation of its duties 
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.97  The United 
States had failed to properly advise fifty-one Mexican nationals, 
including the plaintiff, Medellin, of their rights under the Vienna 
Convention, and because of this, the ICJ determined that those fifty-one 
nationals should have their convictions and sentences under Texas law 
reviewed.98  Despite the ICJ decision in Avena, and a memorandum 
written by then President George W. Bush advising the Texas courts to 
adhere to the decision, Texas refused to reconsider those fifty-one 
criminal cases.99  The issues therefore presented to the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Medellin were whether the Avena decision could be “directly 
enforceable as domestic law in a state court in the United States” as a 
judicial decision handed down from an international tribunal, and 
whether the President’s memorandum made it enforceable, whether or 
not the decision alone was sufficient to make it so.100  
                                                     
94 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. However, the principle of good faith adherence to treaties is seen 
as much more than a “mere” obligation; rather, it is an important 
principle for the international legal community, as indicated by the 
inclusion of the concept “pacta sunt servanda” in the Vienna 
Convention on the Laws of Treaties.  Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating, “every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith”).  The phrase literally means, “agreements must 
be kept.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 957 (9th ed. abr. 2010). 
97 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 498. 
100 Id. 
Journal of International Law 
119 
 
The Supreme Court determined that the Vienna Convention 
was a non-self-executing treaty, and therefore that its provision that 
parties must respect ICJ decisions is not binding on state courts.101  The 
Court specifically looked at the language “undertakes to comply,” 
taken from Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter.102  The finding 
by the Court matched the argument offered by the United States, that 
“the phrase ‘undertakes to comply’ is not ‘an acknowledgement that an 
ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of U.N. 
members,’ but rather ‘a commitment on the part of U.N. Members to 
take future action through their political branches to comply with an 
ICJ decision.’”103  The Medellin court determined that the Texas state 
courts were not themselves obligated to follow the Vienna Convention 
or the U.N. Charter, as the relevant provisions were not to be 
considered as federal law; in order for this international treaty to be 
binding to the states, the federal government had to take enforcing 
action.104   
 
When the Medellin rationale is applied to the state actions 
comprising the American Laws for American Courts movement, it 
seems as though Medellin provides an excuse from the seemingly 
airtight obligations commanded in the U.S. Constitution.105  The fact 
remains, however, that no matter how domestically enforceable a treaty 
may be, the treaty, or, as in Medellin, the affected judgment of an 
international tribunal, still creates an international obligation on the part 
of the United States.106  Therefore, Medellin cannot be counted on by 
proponents of banning international law to allow them to escape the 
requirements of the Constitution.107  When a state disregards 
international law, it is effectively violating international law on behalf 
                                                     
101 Id. at 508–09. 
102 Id. at 508.  Article 94(1) of the UN Charter states that “[e]ach 
Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision 
of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.”  U.N. Charter art. 94, 
para. 1. 
103 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508 (emphasis in original). 
104 Id. at 509–10. 
105 Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause’s 
command that “all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land”), with Medellin 552 U.S. at 498 (the Supreme Court’s 
proposition that non-self-executing treaties are not directly enforceable 
against the states). 
106 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 522–23. 
107 See id.  
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of the United States as a whole.108  Even if the American Laws for 
American Courts legislation specifically stated that only non-self-
executing treaties were to be banned, ignoring such treaties would 
nevertheless be a violation of the United States’ responsibility to adhere 
in good faith to international law.109 
 
 Effective Promotion of Rights C.
 
A pressing question to ask next, regardless of legality, is 
whether these laws are in the end a good idea.  When comparing the 
stated purposes of the American Laws for American Courts movement 
with the general goals of international law, it becomes apparent that 
both ultimately attempt to promote the same thing: rights.110  
Additionally, it is often impractical to eliminate what could be an 
important and relevant piece of law from a judge’s available sources.111 
 
The primary goal of the American Laws for American Courts 
movement is that “no U.S. citizen or resident should be denied the 
liberties, rights, and privileges guaranteed in our constitutional 
republic.”112  States fear that non-American laws and judicial decisions 
handed down from any kind of subjectively-defined foreign system 
might not uphold American constitutional rights in the way they ought 
to be upheld; as a consequence, all religious, foreign, and international 
law should be removed from consideration in a state court by a state 
judge.113 Only state and federal law, therefore, is assumed to be capable 
of protecting the rights of Americans.114 
 
Although this vision might have some, albeit dubious, merit 
regarding those religious laws and foreign laws coming from countries 
with very different cultural norms, it seems counterintuitive to ban 
international law, considering that much of international law has been 
developed with the primary intention of protecting and promoting 
human rights.115  The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations 
proclaims “[w]e the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to 
                                                     
108 See id.  
109 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
110 See infra Part II.A; see also U.N. Charter pmbl. 
111 See supra Part II.C. 
112 American Laws for American Courts, supra note 43. 
113 See infra Part II.A. 
114 See infra Part II.A. 
115 See, e.g. U.N. Charter pmbl.  
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reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small . . . .”116  This sounds like the Preamble to the United 
States’ own central document, which, as almost any American could 
recite, states, “We the people of the United States . . . secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .”117  It is 
apparent that both documents, and therefore the entities they govern, 
hold the well-being of their constituents as paramount importance.118  It 
could even be argued that the United Nations is more concerned with 
the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual than the 
United States, based only on the plain text of the provisions quoted 
above.119  
 
 Although the lofty goals of the drafters and signatories 
usually appear in the preamble of a document, there are other document 
sections that indicate the strong emphasis on rights present in 
international law.  Article I of the UN Charter provides a more detailed 
explanation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.120  
The United Nations intends “to develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights” and to also 
“achieve international co-operation . . . in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”121  
 
Numerous international agreements have as their sole aim the 
promotion and protection of rights for all people, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Rights,122 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,123 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
                                                     
116 Id. 
117 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
118 See U.N. Charter pmbl.; U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
119 Compare U.N. Charter pmbl. (which openly uses the term “rights” 
twice), with U.S. CONST. pmbl. (where the support of rights is merely 
inferable).   
120 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1-4.  
121 Id. para. 2-3. 
122 Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., G.A. 
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
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and Cultural Rights.124  All three of these documents contain the same 
significant language in their Preambles: “recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”125  
 
A final comment is one that is perhaps the most significant to 
the argument that the United States needs international law to 
effectively promote human rights.  Historically, U.S. courts have had a 
friendly disposition towards international law.126 In fact, it was intended 
that the courts would, in the words of a former U.S. legal advisor to the 
State Department, “not merely accept, but would actively pursue, an 
understanding and incorporation of international law standards out of a 
decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”127  The American legal 
tradition, therefore, originated from British common law and 
subsequently developed with a strong connection to the legal tradition 
of a more global community.128  Even traditionally “American” 
concepts such as “liberty, equal protection, due process of law, and 
privacy have never been exclusive U.S. property, but have long carried 
global meaning.”129 It then follows that the promotion and protection of 
rights is an endeavor best carried out on a global scale, based not just 
on the relevant international efforts towards that end, but on the United 
States’ own legal upbringing.  
 
 A More Effective Means of Protecting Rights D.
 
If states want to protect the rights of their citizens, there are 
other methods they can employ that will further this goal without the 
methods themselves causing an additional problem.  There are some 
limited remedies available under international law for addressing such a 
violation.  More apt, however, is the idea that states should rely on their 
                                                     
124 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
pmbl., G.A. Res 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 
1966). 
125 G.A. Res. 217, supra note 122, at pmbl.; G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 
123, at pmbl.; G.A. Res 2200, supra note 124, at pmbl. 
126 See Harold Hungju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 43, 44–46 (2004).  
127 Id. at 44.  
128 Id. at 44–46; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 252–53 (9th ed. 
abr. 2010).   
129 Koh, supra note 122 at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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existing comity provisions when faced with a conflict between state 
law and one of the types of law banned by the state actions being 
discussed.  
 
1. Article 94(2) 
 
The Medellin court mentioned that if one country feels that 
another country has violated its treaty obligations, the injured party 
may seek a remedy under international law.130  Article 94(2) of the UN 
Charter provides:  
 
If any party to a case [to the ICJ] fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, 
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, 
if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures 
to be taken to give effect to the judgment.131 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken this article to mean that 
decisions handed down by international tribunals, such as the ICJ, are 
not enforceable as local law and are therefore categorized under the 
non-self-executing treaty doctrine.132  The Court states that this 
provision “confirms that the U.N. Charter does not contemplate the 
automatic enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic courts.  Article 
94(2) . . . provides the sole remedy for noncompliance.”133  Article 
94(2) seemingly permits local courts to have a reprieve from the 
burdens of international judicial decisions, as the Court continues, “the 
U.N. Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is, 
nonjudicial—remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not 
meant to be enforceable in domestic courts.”134  Although a plea to the 
UN Security Council could be a potential solution for the party that has 
been wronged by one country in violation of its international 
obligation, it is certainly not the most practical or effective means of 
protecting rights in United States state courts.  Additionally, Article 
94(2) only provides recourse for violations of ICJ judgments, not for 
violations or general disregard of international law in treaty form.135  
 
                                                     
130 Medellin,552 U.S. at 509.  
131 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.  
132 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 509. 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2; see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 509.  
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2. Comity  
 
A better method of protecting rights that does not involve an 
outright ban of any and all non-American law is for courts to perform a 
case-by-case evaluation when a conflict comes up.  Comity may also be 
used to appease states’ concerns about international law. 
 
Comity is defined as “[a] practice among political entities (as 
nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. 
mutual recognition or legislative, executive, and judicial acts.”136  
Generally, this means that courts, such as the state courts discussed in 
this Comment, should hold it in good practice to look at foreign 
judgments and rather than deciding the case or issue anew, determine 
whether the standing foreign decision would violate state law or public 
policy.137  If the foreign judgment is not in violation of any important 
state interest, the foreign judgment should be upheld by the state 
court.138  The practice of comity would appear to already provide for the 
purposes of these recently proposed enactments, making them seem 
unnecessary as superfluous legislation.139 
 
Throughout history, American courts have used comity to 
enforce foreign laws in situations ranging from private matters to larger 
scale business dealings between nations.140  In 1839, the Supreme Court 
discussed the merits of comity between different countries, particularly 
where the rights of an individual are at stake.141  The Court wrote, “it is 
needless to enumerate here the instances in which, by the general 
practice of civilized countries, the laws of the one, will, by the comity 
of nations, be recognized and executed in another, where the rights of 
individuals are concerned.”142  Before any proponent of the American 
Laws for American Courts movement can object to this, it should be 
noted that the Supreme Court continued,  
 
Courts of justice have always expounded and 
executed [foreign laws] according to the laws of the 
                                                     
136 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (9th ed. abr. 2010). 
137 Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 23 (2008). 
138 See id.  
139 See supra Part II.A.  
140 See generally Paul, supra note 137. 
141 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839). 
142 Id.  
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place in which they were made; provided that law 
was not repugnant to the laws or policy of their own 
country.  The comity thus extended to other nations is 
no impeachment of sovereignty.  It is the voluntary 
act of the nation by which it is offered; and is 
inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or 
prejudicial to its interests.  But it contributes so 
largely to promote justice between individuals, and to 
produce a friendly intercourse between the 
sovereignties to which they belong; that Courts of 
justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the 
voluntary law of nations.143 
 
Clearly, comity has a longstanding tradition in U.S. courts, 
even state courts, and has provided a working method for allowing non-
American laws to come in when useful, but keeping them out of 
American courts when their implementation would be an affront to 
American values.144  
 
A form of comity could be used when the conflicting law is 
international law. Neither the states nor the American Laws for 
American Courts movement give specific examples of when an 
international law may be at issue in a state court,145 but if such situation 
did arise, state judges could apply the public policy test to determine if 
the international law should be used.  By using this already available 
provision, no state would have the need to create legislation like the 
Oklahoma Save Our State Amendment or the Arizona Foreign 
Decisions Act. 
 
A related doctrine relevant to this discussion is the “Charming 
Betsy” rule used for the interpretation of federal statutes.146  Moving 
higher up the judicial hierarchy, it has been established that because 
international treaties are the law of the land, federal laws cannot be in 
violation of treaties without violating the United States’ obligations 
                                                     
143 Id. (emphasis added). 
144 See id.; see also Paul, supra note 137, at 38. 
145 See H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Save Our 
State Amendment); see H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2011) (“Arizona Foreign Decisions Act”); see American Laws for 
American Courts, supra note 43. 
146 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
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under international law.147  To that end, the Supreme Court has noted, 
“it has been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other construction 
remains.”148  No law in the United States should be interpreted to 
violate international law.149  Following that analysis, it becomes obvious 
that if Congress must interpret itself to be in compliance with 




The American Laws for American Courts movement is a 
nationwide trend that has arguably positive goals, but is going about 
accomplishing them in a way that is sure to violate more rights than it 
protects.150  Banning international law outright from state courts is not 
an effective means of promoting the rights of individuals.151  
Furthermore, state governments do not have the power to enact 
legislation like the Oklahoma Save Our State Amendment or the 
Arizona Foreign Decisions Act under the U.S. Constitution.152  As both 
legal scholars and the United States Supreme Court itself have 
indicated, “like it or not, both foreign and international law are already 
part of our law.”153  It is clearly inescapable that international law is 
United States law, and state legislatures should not be permitted to 
declare otherwise. 
                                                     
147 See supra Part II.B; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.  
148 Murray, 6 U.S. at 118. 
149 See id. 
150 See supra Part II.C. 
151 See supra Parts II.C–D. 
152 See supra Part II.B.  
153 Koh, supra note 126 at 57; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 
677, 700 (1900). 
